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Background: The COVID-19 outbreak has heightened ongoing political debate about the international joint
procurement of medicines and medical countermeasures. The European Union (EU) has developed what remains
largely contractual and decentralized international procurement cooperation. The corona crisis has broadened
and deepened public debate on such cooperation, in particular on the scope of cooperation, solidarity in the
allocation of such cooperation, and delegation of cooperative decision-making. Crucial to political debate about
these issues are public attitudes that constrain and undergird international cooperation. Methods: Our survey
includes a randomized survey experiment (conjoint analysis) on a representative sample in five European coun-
tries in March 2020, informed by legal and policy debate on medical cooperation. Respondents choose and rate
policy packages containing randomized mixes of policy attributes with respect to the scope of medicines covered,
the solidarity in conferring priority access and the level of delegation. Results: In all country populations surveyed,
the experiment reveals considerable popular support for European cooperation. Significant majorities preferred
cooperation packages with greater rather than less scope of medicines regulated; with priority given to most in-
need countries; and with delegation to EU-level rather than national expertise. Conclusion: Joint procurement
raises delicate questions with regard to its scope, the inclusion of cross-border solidarity and the delegation of
decision-making, that explain reluctance toward joint procurement among political decision-makers. This research
shows that there is considerable public support across different countries in favor of centralization, i.e. a large
scope and solidarity in the allocation and delegation of decision-making.
. . . .. . . .. . .. . . .. . . .. . .. . . .. . .. . . .. . . .. . .. . . .. . . .. . .. . . .. . . .. . .. . . .. . .. . . .. . . .. . .. . . .. . . .. . .. . . .. . . .. . .. . .
Introduction
T
he outbreak of COVID-19 highlights a crucial challenge for inter-
national cooperation regarding the availability of medicines. On
the one hand, the crisis underscores the need for states to collaborate
in the procurement, allocation and stockpiling of medical counter-
measures, particularly in a health emergency.1,2 On the other hand,
the crisis awakens protectionism and a retreat to national sovereign-
ty in public health. These offsetting responses play out with respect
to key aspects of supranational collaboration in public health,
including: scope (to what extent should such collaboration be lim-
ited to very specific situations?), solidarity (can priority support be
given to countries most in need?) and delegation (can governance be
delegated to supranational institutions and expert bodies?).
These features of international collaboration are debated political
choices, worldwide and among the Member States of the European
Union (EU). The COVID-19 crisis has raised the political sensitivity
of such choices, making citizens’ support (or opposition) a crucial
policy factor for any given step toward (or away from) supranational
collaboration. Despite the salience and importance of citizen sup-
port, we have little systematic information about citizen attitudes
toward supranational cooperation on medical procurement, and
none on the attitudes toward the particular issues of scope, solidar-
ity and delegation.
Research in context
There has been no research measuring population support for inter-
state solidarity in joint procurement of medical countermeasures to
diseases. The WHO’s latest 2016 literature review on research into
public procurement practices, including research into initiatives in
regions other than the EU, highlights findings that success of ini-
tiatives depended on political trust in the process and in trans-
national cooperation, and an international organization leading
and running the collaborative procurement (see supra note 1,
WHO 2016). That research was based on analysis of policy docu-
ments, qualitative interviews and survey research of experts and civil
servants.
Population support as a precursor for political trust and feasi-
bility, hence, is a critical success factor for interstate joint pro-
curement. Earlier research into the EU’s handling of the Swine flu
outbreak taught us that political buy-in for cross-border solidarity
amidst a crisis is difficult to organize. Such buy-in concerns both
citizen support and policymakers. While citizen support was not
researched, qualitative assessment indicated that national policy-
makers supported EU solidarity neither before nor during the
crisis. Yet, afterwards they demonstrated more willingness to or-
ganize solidarity by approving the legal basis for the ‘Joint
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Added value of this study
We report results from a recent five-country randomized survey
experiment into public attitudes toward joint procurement and al-
location of medical countermeasures in the EU. Despite some differ-
ences across sample countries, our results reveal substantial support
to jointly procure medical countermeasures, not only in health
emergencies. Support is greater for joint measures covering more
rather than a limited set of medicines, for granting access to coun-
termeasures based on medical need (solidarity), and for delegating
to European expertise to administer joint measures. This study pro-
vides evidence of population support for a more central EU-role,
including an extension of the existing practice toward redistribution
based on medical need. It also signals the possibility of enlarging this
cooperation from cross-border threats toward medicines more gen-
erally, organizing health solidarity in international settings.
The EU context and political debate
The most far-reaching international joint procurement scheme, and
a frontrunner example in the COVID 19 outbreak, is that of the EU.
Whereas other schemes might be limited to information-sharing or
price-sharing, the EU’s regime for joint procurement opens the door
to interstate solidarity through redistribution of medical counter-
measures.4 However, it is predominantly a voluntary and contrac-
tual, rather than a supranationally-binding, scheme of cooperation.
The European Commission had been encouraging Member States
to agree to a joint procurement scheme since the SARS and Avian
Influenza outbreaks, but only after the influenza AH1N1 outbreak
Member States accepted a legal basis for the 2013 JPA.5 This basis
limits the scheme’s scope to cross-border health emergencies
(Decision No.1082/2013/EU). The JPA applies to joint procurement
of medicines (antivirals, treatments or vaccines), medical devices
(infusion pumps, needles) and ‘other services and goods’ that miti-
gate or respond to cross-border threats to health, including labora-
tory tests, diagnostic tools, decontamination products, masks and
personal protective equipment.6
The JPA is based on voluntary participation of Member States,
and has a largely contractual, ‘intergovernmental’ character. The
Commission plays a central organizational role and heads the
administrative meetings. But for each procurement, a separate com-
mittee of representatives of participating Member States is to be
established. With each tender, participating states decide on criteria
governing allocation of medical countermeasures.7 Participating
states receive the exact amounts they have ordered, but the rate of
delivery varies in accordance with allocation criteria (Article 17 (1)
EU-JPA). In urgent situations, states may request derogation from
these generally applicable criteria, so a state in need may receive the
countermeasures at a faster rate than other states (Article 17 (2) EU-
JPA). This ‘urgency’ is determined by the Commission and partic-
ipating states (sometimes through qualified majority vote) based on
choices made in advance defining the procurement procedure.
This intergovernmental character of the EU’s joint procurement is
not happenstance: any development of EU cooperation in public
health and cross-border health care must overcome significant pol-
itical reluctance.8Azzopardi-Muscat et al. (2017, pp.55–56) empha-
size that the voluntary nature of the JPA and its ‘ownership’ by
participating Member States were preconditions for its acceptance
and development. Simultaneously, these scholars explain how this
set-up comes with limitations: the incentives for Member States to
participate differ, and securing their ongoing commitment is diffi-
cult (for instance, they can organize parallel national procurement
for the same products); and representation in the scheme, and a
Member State’s voting weight is proportionate to its ‘buy-in’ or
investment in the particular procurement, hampering the position
of smaller states that likely have most to gain from the scheme .
Since the outbreak of COVID-19, the European Commission has
used the existing framework as expediently as possible to enhance
Member States’ ability to assemble medical countermeasures.
However, the outbreak also highlighted inefficiencies, due to the
predominantly intergovernmental and voluntary process and the
legally embedded possibilities for non-solidary behavior by individ-
ual states. In June 2020, the EU adopted a Vaccines Strategy, which
uses the emergency procurement regime ‘rescEU’ based on the EU’s
powers in the field of civil protection.9 This created an ad hoc and
temporary centralized procurement capacity, using JPA legal proce-
dures and infrastructure in conjunction with the rescEU emergency
regime to make pre-purchase agreements with the 2.3 billion euro
emergency fund and vaccine developers for the whole EU. These ad
hoc arrangements underscore the importance of a political discus-
sion on a permanent central capacity for the procurement of med-
ical countermeasures and their distribution in accordance with need.
The arguments for such a central capacity are three-fold. First,
central procurement makes it harder for pharmaceutical companies
to play-off Member States against each other by threatening not to
supply to an individual state trying to negotiate lower prices.
Second, having a common stockpile of medical countermeasures
promises efficiencies by mitigating excess demand in some countries
and excess supply in others. Third, because the common stockpile is
larger than any potential national stockpile, it has greater firepower
to target outbreaks of infectious diseases wherever and as soon they
emerge. These points imply that without rules and procedures set ex
ante and without credible commitment to those rules by all Member
States, individual countries will be tempted to secure as much medi-
cine supply as possible at the cost of other countries.10–13
Such centralization is subject to considerable debate in the EU
and its Member States. Citizen support is crucial to any effort to-
ward more centralization in democratic polities.14 The issue is not
only whether populations support some supranational-EU provi-
sions, but also what kind of provisions are favored with respect to
the scope of medicines covered, the solidarity in allocation, and the
delegation to national or EU expertise.
In March 2020, we conducted a survey experiment in five EU
Member States to gauge citizens’ attitudes toward the joint procure-
ment of medicines, focusing on these dimensions of ‘scope’, ‘soli-
darity’ and ‘delegation in supranational expertise’. Our experiment
sheds light on the feasibility of cross-border solidarity in public
health policies. Solidarity is key to risk sharing and redistribution
in the realization of universal health care ‘within’ states, but also in
relationships with other states in public health policies.15,16
Methods
Our research design is based on a conjoint experiment,17–20 fielded
among 10 000 respondents in France, Germany, Italy, the
Netherlands and Spain. These countries vary with respect to health-
care systems and economic performance, and capture a balance of
northern and southern European polities that may differ in views on
EU healthcare solidarity. Fieldwork was conducted in March 2020
by the survey company IPSOS by means of their online panels, from
which a sample of 2000 individuals was drawn in each of the five
countries studied.
The internal validity of the experiment rests on the random as-
signment of the treatments to the respondents that allows a causal
interpretation of the responses to differences in the treatments along
the three dimensions. We also control for individual-level attentive-
ness through an attention check built into the survey questionnaire,
and our findings are robust to dropping respondents who provide
inconsistent answers.
This being an original experiment, we cannot directly compare
our results to independent studies. But the external validity
is enhanced by the sample’s representativeness relative to the
population, reflecting the quality of the panel and the use of
country-specific sample quotas for age, gender, education, occupa-
tion and regional distribution. Furthermore, our trust in external
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validity is helped by the high correlation (0.87) between the level of
support for EU membership found in our survey and that found in
an identically worded question from a November 2018 survey in the
same countries.21
Respondents were asked to choose among and judge different
policy packages, containing hypothetical procurement and alloca-
tion policies. These questions were introduced by a general framing
on medical procurement in Europe (see Supplementary Appendix
S1). We then presented respondents with policy packages varying
across three dimensions of their design. The first dimension (ques-
tion) covered the ‘scope’: ‘For which medicines should collective EU
purchases be organized?’ (answers: either ‘Only for a limited set of
medicines used to stop large-scale disease outbreaks’; or ‘For all
medicines where collective purchase can be financially beneficial’).
The second dimension referred to the presence or absence of need-
based ‘solidarity’: ‘Is there priority access to medicines?’ (answers:
either ‘No, each participating country has its own fixed share, which
it can use whenever and how it wants’; or ‘Yes, in order to prevent a
contagious disease from spreading, some countries may have prior-
ity access to the common stockpile’). The third dimension was
about ‘delegation’ to international institutions and expertise: ‘Who
decides about the way in which the medicines are to be used?’
(answers: either ‘Experts in a common European agency’; or
‘Experts in national agencies decide’) (see Supplementary
Appendix S1). Respondents were asked to assess three pairs of pack-
ages by indicating which one of the packages in each pair they prefer
(or least object to), and also by rating each of the six observed
packages individually as something they either reject or support.
This results in two measures of how much respondents embrace
or eschew a specific procurement policy. Choose Package is based on
whether or not a given package-pairing-respondent-country was
chosen (0¼ judged as worse than the paired alternative; 1¼ judged
as better than the shown alternative), while Support Package is based
on the (five-point Likert scale) rating that respondents gave to each
of the six packages they saw (regardless of choice per pairing):
1¼ strongly against; 2¼ somewhat against; 3¼ neither in favor or
against; 4¼ somewhat in favor; 5¼ strongly in favor. The Choose
Package and judgment-based Support Package correlate highly
(Pearson’s correlation coefficient¼ 0.51). Our analysis accounts
for differences between countries and possible sampling
composition-effects (controlling for age, gender, income, education,
pairing order of questions, worry about COVID-19, etc.), and also
seeks to ensure that our respondents understood the questions by
focusing on those who passed a standard attention check (weeding-
out 14.7% of the sample).
Results
Both Choose Package and Support Package provide bases for judging
the policy ingredients that respondents embrace or eschew. The
Support Package measure, however, also provides a basis for gauging
overall support for EU joint procurement generally, since a judged
package’s policy features were randomized and since respondents
can express opposition or neutrality as well as support for a package.
Figure 1 provides a snapshot of such support—averaged across all
possible policy combinations shown (randomly) to our respondents.
It displays the share of packages toward which respondents were
strongly against (1), somewhat against (2), neither against nor favor
(3), somewhat favor (4) and strongly favor (5). The figure presents
results for the pooled sample and then for each of the five national
sub-samples.
For both the pooled sample and national sub-samples, we see
sizeable support for joint procurement policy: for the pooled sample
(44.7% somewhat or strongly favor, vs. 19.5% somewhat or strongly
against); for France (43.6% favor, 19.9% against); for Germany
(43% favor, 24.1% against); for Italy (43.8% favor, 16.5% against);
for Netherlands (45.3% favor, 23.4% against) and for Spain (49%
favor, 16.9% against). Moreover, the support is balanced over the
sample countries, despite the frequently reported differences in pol-
iticians’ willingness to transfer national competences to the EU.
Conjoint analysis is particularly useful to assess the impact of
specific design features of the policy packages on support or oppos-
ition. This is possible by regressing support or choice of a package
on the (randomly assigned) policy features across the dimensions.
Our baseline estimates focus on Support Package (binary)
(0¼ strongly or somewhat against, or neutral; 1¼ somewhat or
strongly favor), and on our key explanatory factors: dummies for
each value of each dimension. Being experimentally derived, these
dimension attributes can be seen as empirically orthogonal to one
another (see supra note 17, Hainmueller et al.),22 such that the
marginal effects of policy attributes can be estimated by linear
OLS regression with robust standard errors clustered by respondent,
regressing support or choice on dummies for each level of each
attribute (excluding a reference category for each dimension). Our
preferred specifications include individual-level controls for age,
gender, income, education, COVID-19 worry and a package’s
pairing-order. These controls address possible remaining omitted
variable bias for individual conditions relevant to international soli-
darity,23 and mitigate heteroskedasticity and composition-effects or
effects due to the order in which packages are shown to the respond-
ent. However, the baseline results are robust to alternative specifi-
cations in terms of whether we focus on Choose Package or
categorical measures of Support Package, on other respondent or
package controls, or different estimators.
Figure 2 summarizes the key results, focusing on the ‘average
marginal component effect’ (AMCE) of a given value of each of
the dimensions. Such AMCEs gauge the causal effect of a given
attribute value, compared to the baseline attribute value, on the
probability of supporting a package. The AMCE for each attribute
level is equal to the estimated coefficient on its dummy. The relative
size of how much a given policy feature influences a respondent’s
support for EU policy must be judged in reference to the horizontal
axis capturing the support level at a given dimension’s baseline value
(see the hollow circles on the line). We also show the 95% confi-
dence intervals of these effects. The figure displays the results for the
pooled average of all respondents (given by the first dark dots) and
for the country sub-samples.
The patterns include meaningful differences across the countries
but are consistent in terms of what most drives support. First, a
respondent’s judgment of packages tends not to be strongly driven
by whether the policy covers limited or all relevant medicines. Public
support increases with (a significant) 3 percentage points if the pol-
icy includes such coverage, compared to a policy focusing only on a
narrow set of medicines (the baseline). This pattern, however, masks
differences in degree between countries, with only respondents in
the Netherlands and Spain being statistically so inclined (the other
polities not significantly more or less likely to support procurement
covering more medicines).
Second, respondents are substantively and statistically significant-
ly more likely to support giving priority access to particular coun-
tries to prevent contagion: focusing on ‘PRIORITY ACCESS’, we see
that support tends to be about 19 percentage points higher when a
policy gives priority access to countries where a contagion can be
traced, i.e. based on need, as compared to merely providing access
based on pre-set and fixed country quotas (the baseline). All country
sub-samples undergird this pattern, though to different degrees
(Italians are ‘only’ 12% more likely to support such priority access,
while Germans are more than 23% more likely to do so).
Third, we see meaningful differences across countries in how sup-
port for joint procurement is shaped by EU-level vs. national-level
experts administering of the policy. The pooled average suggests that
respondents are weakly disinclined (about 2% less) to support
national-level administration compared to EU-level administration
(the baseline). But this pro-EU-level pooled result masks differences
across sub-samples: French, German and Spanish respondents drive
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that result, while the Italians tend to be more positively swayed by
national-level administration and the Dutch are not swayed one way
or another by national versus EU-level control.
How such marginal effects play out for predicted support for
EU procurement is captured by figure 3, modeling the (counter-
factual) support for each of the eight possible combinations of
alternative policy attributes. We include a low-floor and a high-
ceiling estimate. The low-floor is based on results from Support
Package commanded by a given package, shown by gray bars with
95% confidence intervals. This low-floor estimate presumes that,
in an imaginary referendum, all neutrals would vote against the
package. More likely is that at least some of the neutrals would
support the package or not participate in a vote. Hence, we also
show a ‘high-ceiling’ estimate that presumes that neutrals stay
home on election day. These high-ceiling predictions are captured
by the vertical solid-line 95%-confidence intervals of predicted
support. Figure 3 shows the results, again for the pooled sample
and the five country sub-samples.
In the pooled sample, the most supported package features a
combination where the degree of policy centralization is at its
maximum, i.e. joint procurement of all medicines where there is
a benefit, allocation based on urgency and execution at the EU-
level. Also noteworthy, and in line with the marginal effects sum-
marized in figure 2, the priority access dimension is what most
makes or breaks support for EU procurement: “urgency based”
versus “contribution based” appears to be the significantly most
favored, and what pushes even the low-floor results above the 50%
support threshold (see upper-left panel, the last four packages).
The other conditions do not have much effect. The country-
specific results broadly follow this pooled pattern. For each coun-
try and both support measures, all four policy packages featuring
priority access lie uniformly above all four packages featuring
Figure 1 Support and opposition to EU procurement, pooled and by country. Share of total sample judgments of reviewed packages:
strongly against (1); somewhat against (2); neither against nor favor (3); somewhat favor (4) and strongly favor (5).
Figure 2 Average marginal component effect of policy attributes on Support Package, pooled average and by sub-sample country
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access based on contribution. Noteworthy deviations from the
pooled results, however, are found for the Netherlands and
Italy, where packages with national-level governance are most
prized over those with EU-level governance.
To what extent did the timing of the survey—during the global
Covid-19 outbreak—influence respondents’ views? We can isolate
the specific effect of the Covid-19 outbreak by comparing the Dutch
results of our main survey (whose fieldwork took place in the last
week of March 2020) with the results of a pilot study, fielded in the
Netherlands in November 2019, ‘before’ the Covid-19 outbreak.
Results are stable, both in overall level of support and in the
dimension-specific effects (available on request).
The main survey took place when the EU response to the pan-
demic was salient (March 2020), but politicization of the issue was
yet to happen, at least to the extent observed in June 2020. While
this unique timing gives us a glimpse of what ‘pristine’ public opin-
ion may look like for salient but non-politicized issues, our results
must be interpreted with caution, as they do not automatically
ensure that stable majorities for an EU layer of health policy as
envisaged in the experiment would survive a politicization, e.g. as
bitter as that observed during the discussion of the EU Recovery
Fund in late Spring 2020. While we present preliminary evidence of
support for centralization, only a repetition of the experiment can
ultimately confirm the stability of such evidence.
Conclusion
Effective international joint procurement requires sufficient scope,
capacity to organize solidarity with countries that are most in need,
and delegation in the decision-making. Whether populations
support such centralization of procurement and its extensions into
distributional choices and pooling of expertise is a crucial question
for health governance in Europe. A survey experiment in five
countries shows not only potential majority support for EU joint
procurement; results also suggest that the most supported package
features a combination where the degree of centralization is at its
Figure 3 Predicted support for possible policy packages, pooled and by country. Bars indicate predicted support based on Support EU
Procurement (1¼ somewhat or strong support; 0¼neutral or somewhat or strong opposition); upper intervals indicate predict Support-vs.-
Oppose EU Procurement (1¼ somewhat or strong support; 0¼ somewhat or strong opposition)
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maximum, i.e. joint procurement of ‘all’ medicines where there is a
benefit to be reaped, allocation based on urgency and execution at
the EU-level.
Supplementary data
Supplementary data are available at EURPUB online.
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Key points
• EU joint procurement raises delicate questions with regard to
its scope, the inclusion of cross-border solidarity and the dele-
gation of decision-making, which explains reluctance toward
such aspects of joint procurement among political decision-
makers.
• Crucial to political debate about these issues are public atti-
tudes that constrain and undergird international cooperation.
• This article reports on a randomized survey experiment
among EU citizens regarding EU joint procurement of medical
countermeasures to large scale disease outbreaks.
• In all country populations surveyed, the experiment reveals
considerable popular support for EU joint procurement,
where significant majorities preferred cooperation packages
with greater rather than less scope of medicines regulated;
with priority given to most in-need countries; and with dele-
gation to EU-level rather than national expertise.
• This research shows that there is a considerable public support
across different countries in favor of centralization, i.e. a large
scope, solidarity in the allocation and delegation of decision-
making.
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